As we have seen above, the separate product test is a substitute for the effects of commitment agreements both on the harm suffered by competitors and on the well-being of consumers. If the test of the separate product is not satisfied (i.e. there is no separate demand for the “tied” product), it follows that (1) there is no harm to competition due to the absence of a separate market for related products that could be excluded and (2) improve welfare (if not, consumers would request products separately). Conversely, if the separate product test is met, it follows that there could be some harm to competition51 and that an identifier is unlikely to be beneficial to well-being. Incentives for the incumbent to monopolize the complementary good market may exist even if market entry is free, provided that there are external network realities in that market, i.e. consumer ratings for the complementary good have been an increasing function of the number of other users. Carlton and Waldman have shown that the connection of the complementary good to the monopoly product gives the monopoly a head start in the race for the standard in the complementary market market. This incentive exists because the incumbent operator is subject to the threat of its monopoly on the primary market for quality goods. Otherwise, it would prefer to be competitive on the market of complementary quality, in order to ensure the adoption of the best standard and to appropriate the rents obtained through this standard by a higher price on the market for primary products. Competing nail manufacturers complained to the Commission that Hilti was at the forefront of abusive acts which had severely limited its penetration of the Hilti compatible nail market. These practices included the attachment to the sale of nails to the sale of cartridge strips, the refusal to respect warranties when customers used third-party nails in their Hilti weapons, the refusal to deliver cartridge strips to customers who could resell them, and “frustrating or deferred legitimately available licenses of rights available under Hilti`s patents”.
83 (b) Reseeding agreements Powerful undertakings have been prohibited from entering into lifting agreements, i.e. . . .