1979 High Level Agreement Cyprus

In an official White House statement on June 8, 2016, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden and Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim reaffirmed their strong support for “an agreement that unites the island as a bi-municipal bi-zonal federation.” [105] The critical provisions of the comprehensive settlement agreement, approved by both Communities in simultaneous referendums, must have legal certainty, in particular as regards the eu and international courts. The Guarantee and Alliance Agreements, which proved their effectiveness by preventing the Union with Greece in 1974, must remain in force in order to avoid any breach of the terms of the new Conciliation Agreement. According to the final proposals, the Republic of Cyprus would become the United Republic of Cyprus. It would be a bulk federation that would be composed of two component states. The Cypriot state in northern Turkey would account for about 28.5% of the island and the Cypriot state in southern Greece would make up the remaining 71.5%. Each party would have had its own Parliament. There would also be a bicameral parliament at the federal level. In the Chamber of Deputies, the Turkish Cypriots would have 25% of the seats. (Although no precise figures are currently available, the division between the two Communities at independence in 1960 was about 80:20 in favor of the Greek Cypriots.) The Senate would be composed equally of members of any ethnic group. Executive power would be vested in a presidential council.

The presidency of this council would rotate between the communes. Any community would also have the right to veto all laws. Following the referendum of June 2004, the Turkish Cypriot community was transformed into a “Turkish Cypriot State”, despite the opposition of the Cypriot Government to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, of which it has been an observer since 1979. [45] 6. The appointed representatives shall be fully empowered to discuss each subject at any time and should, where appropriate, have parallel access to all interested parties and interested parties. The leaders of the two communities will meet as often as necessary. They keep the ultimate respect for the decision. Only an agreement freely reached by the leaders can be submitted to separate simultaneous referendums. Any form of arbitration is excluded. The Greek Cypriot side is entering an electoral atmosphere for the parliamentary elections in May 2016. If no agreement is reached by then, the parliamentary elections will overshadow the negotiation process. In May 1979, Waldheim visited Cyprus and secured further ten-point proposals from both sides.

In addition to reaffirming the 1977 high-level agreement, the ten points also contained provisions on the demilitarization of the island and the obligation to refrain from destabilizing activities and actions. Soon after, a new round table began in Nicosia. Again, they were only short-lived. First of all, the Turkish Cypriots did not want to talk about Varosha, a recreational area of Famagusta that had been evacuated by the Greek Cypriots when it was invaded by Turkish troops. This was a key issue for the Greek Cypriots. Second, the two sides failed to agree on the concept of “bicommunality”. The Turkish Cypriots believed that the Turkish Cypriot State would be exclusively Turkish Cypriot and that the Greek Cypriot State would be exclusively Greek Cypriot. The Greek Cypriots believed that the two States should consist primarily, but not exclusively, of a particular community. In parallel with the establishment of a peacekeeping force, the Security Council also recommended that the Secretary-General appoint, in consultation with the parties and the guarantor Powers, a mediator to oversee formal peace efforts. U Thant, then UN secretary-general, appointed Sakari Tuomioja, a Finnish diplomat. While Tuomioja saw the problem as essentially international and saw Enosis as the most logical way to find a solution, he rejected the Union on the grounds that it would be inappropriate for a UN official to propose a solution that would lead to the dissolution of a UN member state.

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