Fomin added that the number of countries willing to develop military contacts with Russia has increased, largely due to Russia`s approach of developing dialogue with its partners. He stressed that Russia does not encourage cooperation in the position of violence and not with sanctions, that Moscow aims to develop identical relations. Second, high-quality nodes reveal strategically valuable information about the types of agreements they are willing to sign, which may include questions about the scope of emissions and the accuracy of legal obligations. This information allays concerns about duplicity and illustrates the range of mutually acceptable bargains, effectively reducing the transaction costs of cooperation and facilitating negotiations on distribution outcomes. Political economists claim that the U.S. PRIME PTA were “Bellwethers” who communicated U.S. trade preferences to later partners. Footnote 84 DCAs work by analogy. Following a DCA with Australia in 2006, the Philippine Defence Minister argued that the agreement was “a model for similar agreements with Southeast Asian countries such as Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.” Footnote 85 As expected, the Philippines then cited this DCA in negotiations with Singapore and others. Footnote 86 France has invoked a similar logic in extending defence cooperation to Latin America. In 2002, when the French government urged its legislative authority to ratify a DCA with Argentina, the Prime Minister and foreign ministers issued a joint statement saying: “The agreement provides good visibility to our bilateral defence relations and serves as a model for similar agreements with many partners in the region.” Footnote 87 This forecast was correct. Soon after, France signed DIACs with Venezuela, Peru and Brazil. In conclusion, I turn to H4 with regard to causal mechanisms.
If states have direct means to obtain information on the preferences of a potential partner, they should rely less on third-party sources. I see four possible direct sources: (1) ambassadorial relations that allow governments to exchange information on diplomatic corps, military attachés and possibly espionage; (2) membership in intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) allowing governments to exchange information on ministers in institutional for a; (3) adherence to highly structured IGOs, which can enhance the credibility of information; and (4) highly ionized military alliances requiring a certain degree of contact, integrated command, common troop positions or other confidence-building mechanisms. The appendix lists the sources of operationalization and data. Figure 1. Growth of bilateral defence cooperation agreements, 1980-2010 ISTANBUL – Turkey and Ukraine signed military cooperation agreements in Istanbul on Friday, deepening a defence partnership seen as an attempt to balance Russian rule in the Black Sea region.